

Mapping Foresight Practices Worldwide

Since the 1960s, the study and practice of future studies and foresight significantly spread across the globe, the societal value of the field gained recognition from academia, business, government and non-profit groups worldwide (Öner & Beser, 2011; Popper, Georghiou, Keenan, & Miles, 2010; Varum & Melo, 2010). Future studies started to spread in the 1960s and in the 1990s foresight began to emerge as a more focused decision-making tool; especially in Europe (Keenan, Miles, & Kaivo-Oja, 2003). In general, the practitioner community now refers to the field as foresight or strategic foresight more often and the terms future studies or futurology are used typically by academia (G. Van Alstyne, personal communication, March 7, 2014). Foresight will be the term used throughout this document.

Scoping foresight and its activities globally can be difficult in consideration of diverse definitions and overlapping disciplines in this emerging and dynamic field. Foresight has been defined in several ways (Amanatidou, 2014; Georghiou, 2008). The foresight definition used by the European Foresight Monitoring Network and used in this paper, is “a process which combines three fundamental elements: prospective (long-term or forward-looking) approaches, planning (including policy-making and priority-setting) approaches, and participative approaches (engaging stakeholders and knowledge sources)” (European Union, European Commission, & Directorate-General for Research, 2009, p. 8). As can be seen from this definition, foresight has the potential to be applied by many varied disciplines, e.g., engineering, health care and policy science and builds on knowledge and methods from different disciplines, e.g., planning. Also, there are a number of individuals from diverse disciplines practicing in the foresight field (“Foresight and Futures Studies Graduate Programs - Global List,” n.d.). Thus, the number of organizations, academic programs offered and publications focused ‘on foresight’ are numerous (as outlined below) but it is important to note that they can vary depending on whether foresight is treated as a direct or indirect subject. Further, distinctions are not always clear or reflective of the importance or depth of the foresight activity, e.g., a policy think tank may have a small but highly influential foresight department even if foresight is not the direct focus of the organization.

Regardless, in the last few decades there has been a significant rise of interest in the field (Georghiou, 2008; Varum & Melo, 2010). Currently, over 18 countries have well-established foresight activities (Dreyer & Stang, 2013; European Union et al., 2009); at minimum 22 primarily foresight Masters and or PhD degrees are offered worldwide (“Foresight and Futures Studies Graduate Programs - Global List,” n.d.); and over 100 institutes/research organizations have been identified as focused on foresight (see Appendix). Further, 16 peer-reviewed foresight journals are being published (“Journals,” n.d.). Yet, this information does not tell the reader how and where foresight is practiced worldwide or even why. This paper is a foray into the field to address this gap by providing an overview of foresight through a brief history, a table that lists a selection of characteristics of foresight practices worldwide (see Table 1), a world map that identifies the countries most active in the foresight area (see [Interactive World Map](#)) and basic insights based on this information. With this information, steps towards determining the effectiveness of the field and increasing potential outcomes for foresight in addressing complex challenges will be possible.

A Brief History...

The idea of planning or visioning into the future is not recent, but its development into a field of study is relatively new. The history of the field can be traced back more recently to pioneers such as H. G. Wells who early in the 20th century called for professors of foresight and the study of the future (Wells, 1932). Prior to and after World War II, significant work was completed around military planning and scenarios and then proponents such as Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation in the 1950s expanded the use of scenarios to other areas such as policy. In the meantime, key individuals such as Gaston Berger and Michel Godet developed the foresight field further in Western Europe. Developments in statistics and technology facilitated the development of methods used in foresight work. Key contextual elements and drivers of this field included the critical events of World War II and the arms race, and the rise of environmental issues and social issues throughout the last half of the 20th century (Bell, 2003; Keenan, Miles, & Kaivo-Oja, 2003; Van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, & Wright, 2009).

The oil crisis in the 1970s further demonstrated the importance of planning for potential futures, considering interdependencies of a global society and preparing for limits to growth. Questions around quality of life, values and ethics, and societal progress grew in importance. Greater attention was given to decision-making, preparing for the future, addressing complex challenges, developing new technologies and achieving change both in society and in organizations (Bell, 2003). Large organizations, such as the Royal Dutch Shell Group, and the military were major proponents of using foresight for strategic planning and together with key organization members were especially instrumental in spreading the practice of scenario planning in the 1970s in North America (Keenan, Miles, & Kaivo-Oja, 2003; Schwartz, 1996). By this time countries throughout the world began to study and practice this new field (Van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, & Wright, 2009). As the societal environment of complexity and uncertainty developed further, the interest in the use of foresight for planning, learning, facilitating change and decision-making grew in public, private and non-profit sectors. The highly competitive environment and drive for innovation in the 1990s in North America, Western Europe and East Asia furthered interest in the area (Öner & Beser, 2011). Similarly, globalization and movements towards deliberative democracy, multiple perspectives, transparency and participatory decision-making has had a noticeable effect on foresight. Members of the field highlight the important role of foresight in facilitating greater engagement of stakeholders and giving individuals a voice in the future of their own societies (Giaoutzi & Sapiro, 2013; Havas, Scharfetter, & Weber, 2010).

Foresight, especially after the 1990s, is like a complex ecosystem. Several new bursts of foresight erupt in places and times sometimes seemingly in an arbitrary way and sometimes with a strong sense of logic. The elements of the system are highly interrelated and dynamic. As the landscape evolves, organizations rapidly form, change and die, terms proliferate and create ambiguity, methods emerge and fall out of common use only to get resurrected elsewhere, and people not only assess and plan for the future but in so doing help create the future. However, this occurs in a continuous yet sporadic revolution that does not necessarily follow a clear or planned linear path. Furthermore, the concrete and systematic is as important to foresight as is the creative and unpredictable.

Although foresight is similar to other disciplines, such as the study of history, the field is unique in that it has an action-oriented holistic, multidisciplinary/transdisciplinary and multi-perspective approach. Development of systems theory in the 1960s has had a great influence on foresight as has foresight's interaction with the humanities and popular culture. Yet, foresight is similar to many other new practice fields that have originated in the last century, such as evaluation, visual facilitation and governance. The fields that have emerged within the last half of the past century are not evolving in the same societal context that mature fields such as mathematics or biology have developed and have arguably different relationships to research and practice (Algozo, 2011; Eaton, 1996; Kuhn, 1970). Even though a separate foresight community exists with publications, educational programs, and numerous practitioners, the discipline is still emerging and facing many developmental issues, such as whether professionalization is desirable, what are the role of values, should there be more alignment of foresight community members, and how will varying epistemological perspectives affect the field (Giaoutzi & Sapio, 2013; Marien, 2010). The relatively new disciplines discussed here are likely on a similar pattern of normal emergence but not at the same stage of development; with some fields more mainstream than others. A further examination and comparison of the development of emerging disciplines as compared to foresight would be valuable.

From a normative perspective, the development of foresight aligns with current transformations of society, however, the effective management and success of this transformation still needs to be assessed. I would offer there is no objectively clearly defined right or wrong ways in which certain fields evolve especially in the context of complexity. Rather, there is a significant subjective component to this evaluation. As such, the values of openness, accountability, fairness and citizen engagement are increasingly reflected in different approaches to foresight but how and to what extent these values can practically translate to a desirable future society needs to be continually studied and challenged. A pragmatic and inherently foresight approach is to present alternatives, view the system as a whole, maintain different perspectives and question the status quo. Thus, there is certainly more than one approach to foresight that can benefit society and an open mind is important to foresight approaches. The creativity of the field depends on the ability to use different approaches contingent on the foresight objective, the stakeholders involved and its context. However, the fine balance means a potential trade-off with expedience, quality and clarity in the development of the field.

An Overview of Current Foresight Activities

The information in this report builds mostly on findings from two recently completed surveys: a mapping foresight project completed by the European Foresight Monitoring Network for the European Commission and a survey of a selected range of national governments and international organizations for their involvement in foresight activities (European Union et al., 2009; Dreyer & Stang, 2013). The former study is based on over 2000 initiatives that have been mapped by members of the network between 2004 and 2008 (27 initiatives are mapped for Canada); approximately 1000 of these are considered "fully-mapped". For further details and explanations of the processes and findings please see these sources. The foresight activities examined in these studies do not represent the full use of foresight exercises in the private sector and the many exercises that have not been accounted for through mapping processes, e.g., within Africa (European Union et al., 2009). Although there are limitations to the comprehensiveness of these studies, they provide a good appreciation for the overall scope of foresight and foresight practices worldwide.

Table 1. Characteristics of Foresight Practices Worldwide

Developed countries are more likely to have engaged in foresight activities, be less prescriptive regarding results of foresight analysis, and be more reactive and trepidatious about the future than developing countries (Dreyer & Stang, 2013)
Countries with significant budget funds allocated to their military are more likely to have well-established foresight activities (Dreyer & Stang, 2013)
Decentralized vs centralized and external vs internal governmental foresight operations vary amongst countries (Dreyer & Stang, 2013)
OECD and NATO have very well established foresight activities. Significant activities also take place in the European Union through the European Commission (Dreyer & Stang, 2013)
There are at least 33 different methods used in foresight from which multiple methods can be used per foresight exercise (Popper, 2008)
Governments are the largest funders of foresight activities in all regions, North America and Oceania regions have the largest amount of business sponsorship (European Union et al., 2009)
Government is the main target audience for foresight activities in all regions (European Union et al., 2009)
The time horizon pursued by foresight exercises is mostly in the range of 10 to 20 years into the future (European Union et al., 2009)
Most foresight activities in North America, Latin America and Europe engage fewer than 200 participants per exercise (European Union et al., 2009)
All regions most commonly focus on the national territory for foresight activities (European Union et al., 2009)
The foresight methods very commonly used are expert panels, literature reviews, scenarios and trend extrapolation (European Union et al., 2009)
Outputs (not process related) that are most common are: policy recommendations; analysis of trends and drivers; scenarios; research and other priorities; forecasts; key technologies; and technology roadmaps (Excerpt) (European Union et al., 2009, p. 13)
Research areas can be broad or specific but in North America and Oceania they are more targeted (European Union et al., 2009)
Foresight activities mostly take place in services (socio-economic sector) (European Union et al., 2009)
Three Key Categories of Recommendations: “call for policy shifts and ... call for the creation of new projects, programmes, strategies or discussion”; “incorporation of foresight findings in to ongoing

debates and strategies: suggested action for the private sector and non-governmental organization to pursue; and the need for further research”; and “development of human resources; improvements in academia-industry links; increases in public spending; and greater cooperation across the innovation system, including international cooperation” (European Union et al., 2009, p. 15)

“**Most common foresight objectives:** fostering cooperation and networking; orienting policy development; recognizing barriers and drivers of STI; encouraging futures thinking; supporting STI strategy and priority setting; identifying research and investment areas; generating shared visions; handling Grand Challenges; and triggering actions and discussions.” (European Union et al., 2009, p. 12)

Foresight activities form a “ ‘knowledge junction’ between different research areas and sub-areas” (European Union et al., 2009, p. 14)

The [world map](#) provides a representation of the countries that likely have the most established foresight activities and identified within each country are institutes, key governmental bodies and Masters or Doctorate degrees offered. If both of the main surveys utilized for this paper identify a country with well-established foresight (have a total of over 20 exercises mapped in Mapping Foresight and are listed as “well-resourced and widely used” in the Yearbook of European Security), a yellow pin is placed on the country. If there is incongruence between the two sources as to how well-established foresight seems to be in a country a clear pin is used. If the reader zooms in and selects the country on the map, information about the number of institutes within the country appears. This number is based on the number of institutes that are active in foresight that can be found in each country (see Appendix for listing and hyperlink). These organizations have been located through an Internet search and are primarily in the non-profit or government sectors. They have been selected if they have an active webpage at the time of writing this paper. This is not an exhaustive or precise list, e.g., a few private sector organizations are included. Following the number of institutes is the type of degrees offered and abbreviated name of academic organizations that offer either a Masters or Doctorate degree primarily in foresight (“Foresight and Futures Studies Graduate Programs - Global List,” n.d.). Next, the key government body involved in foresight in each country is identified if the Yearbook of European Security has one primary government body selected. Thus, some countries do not have government bodies identified. If the reader is interested in this information, Mapping Foresight (European Union et al., 2009) and The Handbook of Technology Foresight (Georghiou, 2008) list multiple governmental bodies per country. Finally, symbols for academic institutions has been added to the map for those countries who offer graduate degree programs but have not been identified otherwise as having the most established foresight activities.

Preliminary Insights

Several preliminary insights can be drawn from the information reviewed, four key insights are as follows, foresight as an applied subject area: is seemingly disorganized and incoherent, can be considered elite-focused, is in need of further surveys, and offers uncaptialized opportunities to generate significant value.

Foresight: a New Field Emerging Within Complexity

The first insight is that technically foresight is an emerging area of a relatively new field, future studies, and has been born in the 1990s into a rapidly paced world of complexity. As a

new area, definitions of concepts such as foresight vary and practices are different and evolving (Amanatidou, 2014; Bell, 2003; Georghiou, 2008). Organizations are undergoing rapid transformations, common standards are not developed, different methodological directions are provided, no governing body exists and as such the growth of the area can seem haphazard. Other contributing factors are that the field traverses between art and science, different epistemological perspectives, different types of practitioners and an attempt to professionalize as well as make the field entirely accessible to lay individuals, creating confusion for academics, practitioners and participants alike (Bell, 2003; Marien, 2010; Varum & Melo, 2010). Further, foresight is often susceptible to changes as soon as fiscal constraints become primary, sometimes constraints act as a driving force and other times they threaten the existence of programs (Dreyer & Stang, 2013). With the presence of foresight mostly in governments (European Union et al., 2009), the field is also directly exposed to the instabilities of the political realm. New technologies and new players continue to change the landscape of the field. The ecosystem can seem chaotic and is underlined by dynamic emergence. It continues to gain in popularity as uncertainty and risk spread.

Can Foresight Seem Elitist?

Although foresight is in many ways attempting to be more open and inclusive (Daheim & Uerz, 2006), the next insight is that foresight can be elitist. Due to the nature of decision-making and strategic use of foresight, key officials usually need to be involved in the foresight process. Science and technical innovation builds on the in depth knowledge of technical and academic experts. Beyond these factors, for effectiveness of foresight activities, those foresight groups that directly report to and work with executives have a greater chance of recommendations from the exercise being implemented (Daheim & Uerz, 2006; Dreyer & Stang, 2013; Johnston & Cagnin, 2011). In addition to this, many of the methods used in foresight are based on working with knowledge experts, e.g., expert panels and genius forecasting. There are methods that specifically attempt to include broad participants, e.g., citizen panels, but these methods are fewer (Popper, 2008). What can be troublesome is that through some of these exercises these experts are accessed to make value judgements for society as a whole (of course, this is not that different from traditional non-foresight methods but is becoming a greater concern as transparency, stakeholder buy-in and citizen engagement become increasingly valued). From another perspective, the finding that some regions use less than 200 participants per exercise and that the methods most often used by regions are expert panels indicate that there is a strong potential to involve experts more often than lay people (European Union et al., 2009). Restrictions on foresight exercises due to resource availability, timing and confidentiality can increase this effect. Since foresight can be considered as nonessential work and can be resource intensive, developed countries with sufficient sized budgets tend to support and use foresight more frequently (Dreyer & Stang, 2013). Larger organizations, similarly, would likely have more experience and resources to use foresight than small lesser-resourced organizations. Finally, as mentioned above, the area of foresight is relatively new and difficult to grasp, especially for those individuals not directly exposed to the subject.

More Research

More surveys are needed on foresight activities to validate data gathered and fill in missing information. Mapping foresight projects worldwide takes a significant amount of effort, especially in this dynamic environment. This document is based on only a few available current sources. Considering different definitions of foresight as well as different approaches to collecting the data, different results would be likely if more studies are completed. Also, gaps in

information exist in terms of overall usage of foresight in the private sector and non-profit organizations as well as in specific regions of the world (Varum & Melo, 2010). This information is difficult to obtain but valuable (Daheim & Uerz, 2006; European Union et al., 2009). However, beyond validating data these surveys could also, for example, help address questions regarding factors impacting successful collaboration among the four sectors (private, public, non-profit and mixed). Further, greater understanding of the diverse stakeholders involved in foresight and their roles, as well as the demand and supply side of foresight's development is important to the field's coherence.

Knowing the Value of Foresight

The last key insight offered is that verifying the value of foresight activities and identifying the areas in which foresight could hold opportunity to benefit organizations and society is an important endeavour. Governments and organizations that have practiced foresight for several years demonstrate that foresight is valuable enough for them to continue to expend significant resources to do so even when financial resources are tight. Foresight offers a way to address complexity and risk, while advancing innovation, learning, different perspectives and dialogue in order to achieve process and outcome benefits.

These benefits can facilitate the current transformation of societies at different levels through organized collaborative change in a time period when doing so is invaluable but very difficult. The value of foresight needs to and continues to be documented (Amanatidou, 2014; Keenan, Miles, & Kaivo-Oja, 2003). Most countries focus on the national level in their foresight activities, yet there are projects pursued at the international, regional or community level. There appears to be an untapped value to which foresight can contribute (Klomp & Van Der Duin, 2014). Meanwhile, most exercises in some regions have 200 or fewer participants. Yet, some regions use greater than this number and there could be the possibility with current technology to increase the number of participants in exercises (European Union et al., 2009). This could also mean involving more non-experts. The question exists as to whether this is an untapped resource.

Evaluating the value of foresight exercises and the increase of participation by non-experts in foresight activities is being researched (Miles, 2012; Rohrbeck, 2012). This could shed light on whether outputs and recommendations actually get implemented and are the outcomes improved. Finally, foresight is not yet a part of society's mainstream knowledge or activities (Varum & Melo, 2010). Clear distinctions between the application and benefits of current non-foresight practices and foresight practices used for similar purposes in all sectors could be beneficial to advancing foresight (Rohrbeck, 2012). Similarly, more consistency and transparency in foresight could be helpful.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has briefly reviewed foresight practices worldwide and determined that foresight is a multi-sector, multidisciplinary field that is well recognized in the international academic and practice communities. However, there are several limitations to this paper: it does not cover the private sector's overall involvement in foresight exercises as well as it does the government sector's (more private sector focused surveys are needed); specific exercises are not reviewed in-depth; projects and tools, such as Media Futures 2020, are not listed; indirect foresight activities are significant in number but not accounted for; and,

identification of numbers of activities are not absolute (especially considering that organizations rapidly change in the current fast-paced environment).

Many of these limitations are very difficult to address within the scope of this paper and in general. Yet, for example, a way in which the private sector works with foresight needs to be examined in greater depth, especially in context of cross-sectoral interactions to form a more complete picture of foresight. Without the better integration of the private sector, understanding the full ecosystem remains elusive. More work including the use of typologies may be helpful in drawing out basic elements of foresight that can be easily visualized, measured and analyzed over time, e. g., cost, approach and time involved. Nevertheless, these limitations do not detract from the broad overview of foresight and from the ability to generate useful preliminary insights. The likely effect is that numbers provided in this paper are less representative of foresight's pervasiveness than the actual numbers (Bell, 2003). Organizations, such as the European Union (see <http://www.foresight-platform.eu/european-foresight-platform>) and academics continue to assess this dynamic and emerging field on an international scale.

Appendix

Nordic Institutes

[FMS, Environmental Strategies Research \(Sweden\)](#)

[The Pufendorf Institute \(Sweden\)](#)

[The Royal Academy of Engineering Sciences \(Sweden\)](#)

[Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research](#)

[Institute for Futures Studies \(Sweden\)](#)

[Kairos Future Group \(Sweden\)](#)

[Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies \(CIFS\) \(Denmark\)](#)

[House of Futures \(Denmark\)](#)

[Finland Futures Research Centre](#)

[Finnish Society for Futures Studies](#)

[Finnish Parliament's Committee for the Future](#)

[The Nordic Innovation Centre \(Norway\)](#)

[International Centre for Integrative Studies \(ICIS\) \(Netherlands\)](#)

[The Netherlands Organization \(TNO\) for Applied Scientific Research](#)

European Institutes

[Futuribles \(France\)](#)

[The Club of Rome \(Switzerland\)](#)

[The Institute for Futures Studies and Technology Assessment \(Germany\)](#)

[The World Future Council \(Germany\)](#)

[The Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations \(FRFG\) \(Germany\)](#)

[Future 25 \(Germany\)](#)

[The Foresight Programme and Horizon Scanning Centre \(UK\)](#)

[Forum for the future \(UK\)](#)

[EcoLabs \(UK\)](#)

[Shaping Tomorrow \(UK\)](#)

[Humanitarian Futures Program, King's College, \(UK\)](#)

[The Future of Humanity Institute \(UK\)](#)

[Manchester Institute of Innovation Research \(UK\)](#)

[International Futures Forum \(Scotland\)](#)

[The Futures Academy @ Dublin Institute of Technology \(Ireland\)](#)

["Poland 2000 Plus" Forecast Committee](#)

[Institute for Strategic Research \(Hungary\)](#)

[The Russian Futures Studies Academy Club 2015, Russia](#)

[The Estonian Institute for Futures Studies](#)

[The Forward Studies Unit \(Latvia\)](#)

Global Institutes

[UNESCO, Bureau of Strategic Planning, Anticipation and Foresight Program \(France\)](#)

[European Science Foundation's Forward Looks \(France\)](#)

[The OECD International Futures Programme \(France\)](#)

[The European Foresight Monitoring Network \(EU\) \(Brussels\)](#)

[Foresight for the European Research Area \(FORERA\)](#)

[Institute for Prospective Technological Studies \(IPTS\) \(Spain\)](#)

[The Millennium Project \(USA\)](#)

[REOS: Innovation in Complex Social Systems](#)

[The World Futures Studies Federation](#)

[Humanity Plus/World Transhumanist Association](#)

USA Institutes

[Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs \(JFK Sch of Govt, Harvard U\) \(USA\)](#)

[Future Search Network \(USA\)](#)

[Institute for the Future \(USA\)](#)

[International Institute of Forecasters \(USA\)](#)

[The Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies \(USA\)](#)

[The Association of Professional Futurists \(USA\)](#)

[Institute for the Future \(USA\)](#)

[The Institute for Alternative Futures \(USA\)](#)

[The Long Now Foundation \(USA\)](#)

[The National Academies Keck Futures Initiative \(USA\)](#)

[The Stanford Center for Foresight and Innovation \(USA\)](#)

[The World Future Society \(USA\)](#)

[The Tellus Institute \(USA\)](#)

[RAND Corporation \(USA\)](#)

[The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future \(USA\)](#)

[Acceleration Studies Foundation \(USA\)](#)

[Foresight Institute \(USA\)](#)

[The DaVinci Institute \(USA\)](#)

[Institute for Global Futures \(IGF\) \(USA\)](#)
[Institute for the Future at AACCC \(USA\)](#)
[Arthur C. Clark Center for Human Imagination @ UCSD \(USA\)](#)
[Resources for the Future \(RFF\) \(USA\)](#)
[The Arlington Institute \(USA\)](#)
[Singularity University \(USA\)](#)
[Global Options \(USA\)](#)
[Norwich University Applied Research Institutes \(NUARI\) \(USA\)](#)
[SRI International \(USA\) \(Menlo Park, CA\)](#)
[TechCast \(USA\)](#)
[Trends Research Institute \(TRI\) \(USA\)](#)
[Science and Technology Innovation Program at WWICS \(USA\)](#)
[Atlantic Council The Strategic Foresight Initiative \(USA\)](#)
[Center for Future Consciousness \(USA\)](#)

Canadian Institutes

[OCAD University Strategic Foresight and Innovation \(Canada\)](#)
[Strategic Innovation Lab \(sLab\) at OCAD University](#)
[Social Innovation Labs](#)
[Policy Horizons Canada](#)
[Foresight Canada](#)
[International Institute for Sustainable Development \(IISD\) -Foresight Group \(Canada\)](#)

Oceania Institutes

[The New Zealand Futures Trust](#)

[metafuture.org \(Australia\)](#)
[Centre for Australian Foresight](#)
[The Asian Foresight Institute \(Australia\)](#)
[Foresight International \(Australia\)](#)

Asian Institutes

[Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation \(APEC\) Center for Technology Foresight \(Thailand\)](#)

[Strategic Foresight Group \(India\)](#)
[The Mother's Service Society \(India\)](#)
[University of Kerala \(India\)](#)

[The Azerbaijan Future Studies Society \(Azerbaijan\)](#)

[The Graduate Institute of Futures Studies \(Taiwan\)](#)

[Center for Engaged Foresight \(Philippines\)](#)

[Centre for Strategic Futures \(Singapore\)](#)

[The Center for Futurism in Education \(Israel\)](#)

[The Interdisciplinary Center for Technological Analysis & Forecasting \(Israel\)](#)

Other Institutes Worldwide

[The Institute for Futures Research \(South Africa\)](#)

[Futures studies Forum for Africa & the Middle East \(FSF\) \(South Africa\)](#)

[International Academy of Political, Administrative, and Futures Studies \(IAPAS\) \(Mexico\)](#)

[Development Foresight Institute \(Jamaica\)](#)

[Nucleo de Estudos do Futuro \(Center for Future Studies\) \(Brazil\)](#)

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